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1 A two-tiered approach to disaster management
For decades, the disaster literature has called
attention to the dual character of climate-related
risk. On the one hand is the level of exposure to the
hazard (the storm, the flood, the drought, etc.), and
on the other hand is the vulnerability of different
socioeconomic systems to the effects of different
natural hazards. To address this vulnerability, some
form of risk management can currently be found in
most countries of the world, although the efficacy
of the risk management systems varies widely.
Political ecologists and others have long advocated
that responding to climate risk should include both
short-term disaster risk response – that is, action to
prepare for and recover from the immediate effects
of disaster (e.g. early warning systems) and structural
reforms that seek to address the factors that define
people’s vulnerability to disasters to begin with
(poverty, lack of education, etc.). Calls for better
policy design and implementation at these two levels
are not new. Yet after 20 years, it is surprising that
more research has not tried to understand why the
bulk of responses to disasters to date have failed to
account for both sides of the vulnerability 
equation.
Our lack of understanding on why disaster risk
reduction has not fared better historically becomes
even more critical when we consider the expected
impacts of climate change on the exposure and
adaptive capacity1 of human systems. Adaptation –
defined as the amount of (potential) damage caused
to a system by a particular climate-related event or
hazard – if successfully designed and implemented
should result in an equal or improved situation (when
compared with the initial condition). Unsuccessful
adaptation occurs when the outcome situation is
worse than before. The latter is frequently the case
when poor countries and the poor within these
countries have barely recovered before the next
storm or drought hits.
The compounding effects of repeated climate-
related hazards makes it almost impossible to avoid
and break the cycle of successive inadequate or
inappropriate adaptation. The ability of different
actors, organisations and systems to break this cycle
hinges specifically on their level of adaptive capacity.
Given the large uncertainty in scenarios of future
climate change and their contextual character, it
makes more sense to focus on building adaptive
capacity than specific adaptations, through
identifying and characterising the attributes
necessary to make these adaptations successful.
While all adaptation is local, adaptive capacity is not.
Generalisations can be made across the divide
between disaster risk reduction and ‘deeper’
structural reform to promote risk management that
contributes to social transformation.
Considerable effort has been made in the literature
to theorise what attributes may enhance the
capacity of human and sociopolitical systems to
prepare for and recover from negative impacts of
climate-related phenomena (Smit et al. 2000; Folke
et al. 2002; Tompkins and Adger 2005; Eakin and
Lemos 2006). Yet, there have been relatively few
empirical studies that seek to understand how this
capacity can or has been built (or not) in the real
world. What factors make human, social and political
systems less vulnerable to climate-related
phenomena? We argue that building adaptive
capacity is a two-tiered process that must include
both risk management to climate impact and deeper
level socioeconomic and political reform that
addresses the root causes of vulnerability, especially
among the vulnerable poor.
Tier one comprises the design and implementation
of risk management institutions – such as disaster
preparedness plans, early warning systems and
emergency disaster relief – that can potentially
mitigate the most immediate and egregious effects
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of climate-related impact, especially among the poor
in society without the capacity to self-rescue. Tier
two encompasses socioeconomic and political
reform that addresses the range of inequalities at
the root of differential vulnerabilities that keep the
poor living in poverty. Reforms such as income
redistribution, land reform, universal education and
healthcare access, and political democracy are just a
few that might be necessary to decrease poverty and
vulnerability in less developed countries. Although
these kinds of reforms have been on the
development agenda for a long time, their poverty-
reducing benefits have proved elusive to most poor
countries in the world. The threat of climate change
as an emergent stressor that will exacerbate
vulnerability makes their implementation more
urgent.
Beyond the state – but certainly not without it – this
two-tiered process must involve a broad number of
institutions within the state–private–community
continuum as well as across different scales of
decision-making (Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Dodman
and Satterthwaite, this IDS Bulletin). On the one
hand, the kind of deep transformation needed to
address inequalities that perpetuate vulnerability
among the poor has historically been economically,
socially and politically too costly for most governance
systems to tackle and the daunting character of its
implementation may be intimidating at best and
paralysing at worst. On the other hand, aiming at
deeper transformation does not have to be an all or
nothing proposition.
One way to spearhead change is to identify which,
among risk management actions currently in place,
can be more or less conducive to create the
conditions for structural reform. Moreover, because
these are not discrete processes, action in one tier
can affect and be affected by action in another, in a
way that creates a positive synergy between them.
Hence, it is important to identify how risk
management institutions can contribute not only to
building adaptive capacity to specific climate-related
hazards but also to decreasing overall vulnerabilities
among groups at risk. For example, by subscribing to
risk management approaches that create positive
synergies across the state–society divide, drought
response planning, hurricane preparedness, or water
management, institutions may create the conditions
to build longer-term adaptive capacity among
vulnerable groups.
Approaches that are inclusionary (participatory),
accountable, transparent and democratic, may be
more conducive to the creation of an empowered
citizenry better equipped to break free from
clientelist systems and to mobilise for social reform.
Similarly, approaches that integrate risk management
with sustainable natural resources use and adaptive
governance may be more conducive to social
learning and to building adaptive capacity and social
capital than top-down approaches that insulate
decision-making from stakeholders (Lemos 2007).
2 Two vulnerable regions, two tales of success
In this article, we draw on previous empirical research
in the Cayman Islands in the Caribbean and Ceará in
NE Brazil to highlight the fundamental components
that underpin the creation of adaptive capacity (Lemos
et al. 2002; Tompkins and Hurlston 2003; Lemos
2003; Tompkins 2005; Lemos 2007).2 Both sites have
been historically vulnerable to climate variability and
extremes (tropical cyclones in the Cayman Islands and
drought in NE Brazil) and their evolving response to
these climate-related hazards over many years may
offer the best analogue available to understand how
capacity can be built to transform society through
disaster risk reduction that addresses vulnerability and
builds adaptive capacity to climate change.
The Cayman Islands are one of the wealthiest
Caribbean islands, with a per capita GDP of
US$33,700 in 1997, with financial services and
tourism providing the backbone to the country’s
economy. The three islands cover 102 square miles,
have a population of approximately 43,000, and are
a UK Overseas Territory. Ceará, in contrast, is one of
the poorest states in Brazil, with a population of
7 million and over 90 per cent of its territory is
semi-arid. Until recently, drought response in Ceará
has been characterised by the infamous ‘drought
industry’, that is, the corrupt misappropriation and
misuse of public funds earmarked for drought-relief
(Lemos et al. 2002). Two traditional approaches to
risk management have been particularly clientelism-
prone: the implementation of emergency response
and the construction of extensive waterworks to
store and move water, including the creation of
work fronts and the distribution of food baskets and
water trucks to communities in distress. All these
activities were often subject to corruption and abuse;
for example, it was common for politicians to
exchange votes for placement in the work fronts or
food basket programmes.
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For the past 30 years both regions have experienced
rapid socioeconomic progress, although Ceará
remains a highly unequal society (Lemos 2007).
Whereas the two regions differ considerably in GDP
per capita, wealth distribution, physical characteristics,
politics and culture, we find that their path to reduce
vulnerability to hazards has much in common. We
suggest that if it is possible to identify common
markers of successful transformation in such distinct
policy environments, then maybe such markers can
be generalisable to a wide variety of environments,
especially in less developed regions of the world.
In comparing the two sites, we find that four factors
were critical to improving disaster management in
both cases (Tompkins et al. 2008). First, the agencies
and organisations responsible for disaster
management were flexible, able to learn from past
success and/or failure and to build on their
relationship with stakeholders to push forward the
policy agendas and their implementation. Second, a
group of committed, reform-minded and politically
active actors in the public (in NE Brazil) and in the
public and private sectors (in the Cayman Islands)
championed a series of changes that addressed
critical needs (i.e. shelter and emergency supplies for
those in poorly constructed homes in the Cayman
Islands and employment and income for those
affected by drought in Brazil) and lent the nascent
institution credibility and political feasibility. Third,
these organisations and individuals sought to
integrate disaster management into other policy
processes, creating an approach to disaster
management that was much better suited to the
changing nature of social disasters and the many
stressors beyond the physical hazard causing them.
Fourth, in both cases there was a long-term
commitment to investing in disaster risk
management and in collaborative learning-based
approaches to managing risk.
Through the years, and many disasters, flexible,
learning organisations and stakeholder involvement have
been a critical part of risk reduction and vulnerability
reduction in the Cayman Islands and Ceará. Since the
late 1980s/early 1990s, a confluence of positive
factors – including political reform, government
reorganisation, changes in government priorities and
regulatory institutions – have enabled the National
Hurricane Committee (NHC) in the Cayman Islands,
and the state Civil Defence agency (CEDEC) in Ceará
to achieve a much higher level of efficacy to build
adaptive capacity to better manage hurricanes and
drought respectively.3 While the NHC evolved from a
committee of volunteer civil servants loosely
organised by the government to a formalised,
efficient, quasi-government management
organisation, CEDEC was able, for the first time, to
establish a centralised structure that coordinated the
efforts from all areas of the state government to
respond to drought. At the same time, both
organisations actively sought to involve stakeholders
in the design of their risk reduction plans.
In the Cayman Islands, members of the NHC sit on
the various committees that advise the government
on long-term planning (such as the Central Planning
Authority that allocates planning approval). Annually,
leading actors in the different economic sectors and
government departments get involved in planning for
the next hurricane season. Among the islanders, there
is a strong perception of social interdependence and a
staunch belief in collective action as the way to ensure
support for all sections of society. Inclusion of all
government departments, private firms, churches,
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), primary care
agencies, community leaders and charitable
organisations ensures that all members of society are
considered in hurricane planning, and that the most
vulnerable are identified and prioritised in annual
planning. This level of inclusion also means that there is
a strong support network throughout the islands,
reinforced year after year as different communities,
sectors, businesses and government agencies find that
they are either affected by a hurricane or involved in
the response and clear up (Tompkins 2005).
In Ceará, the new approach to drought response
was also marked by the use of inclusive committees.
CEDEC created community-based committees –
COMDECs (Comitê de Defesa Civil) – to identify and
rank the families of each community according to
need. The committees included representatives of
several sectors of society such as the Church, rural
labour unions, city council representatives, landowner
associations, state officials, and professional
associations. The COMDEC’s generated lists were
then prioritised within the município and used as a
basis for the distribution of jobs, food baskets and
water trucks. CEDEC also introduced a state-wide
ranking of municípios affected by drought based on
‘techno-scientific criteria’, which institutionalised the
declaration of drought emergency outside the
purview of local politicians (Lemos 2003). These
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changes were not an isolated event but part of much
broader reforms that sought to transform and
modernise the state.4 In the process, Ceará
transitioned from a staunch political oligarchy to a
more democratic regime where Brazil’s reform-
oriented politicians have experienced surprising
success. Maybe the most critical outcome of the new
system has been the attempt to break with the
vicious cycle of drought and clientelism in which the
survival of traditional politics is predicated on the
persistence of drought and its impacts – that is, only
by keeping their electorate vulnerable to drought can
politicians guarantee their bargaining power in time
of elections. In this context, it is not surprising that
politicians may have strong incentives to keeping the
cycle of poverty and vulnerability intact.
As a result, in addition to the COMDECs, new
avenues for civil society participation in drought-
related planning at the local level have been created,
including participatory vulnerability mapping at the
município level (Nelson 2005) and river basin
committees (Lemos 2007). However, the ability of
the very poor to participate in these fora has been
mixed. While overall there certainly are more
opportunities for inclusion, the level of actual
participation of the poorest segments of the Ceará
population has been low (Taddei 2005).
Nevertheless, these participatory mechanisms
represent progress in enhancing benefits to the poor
when compared with past drought policies.
Learning from successes and failures of past years has
been an integral feature of the response strategy of
both the NHC and CEDEC. In the Cayman Islands, at
the end of every hurricane season, the NHC reviews
what it has done effectively the year before and
what has not worked – in the past failures have
included slow restoration of power to remote
communities, or inadequate provision of medical and
food supplies in the district shelters. Lessons learned
after each season are incorporated into existing
hurricane plans (in each and every government
department and agency), with a view to improving
hurricane response the following year. This process
requires active identification of the most vulnerable,
i.e. those who were not adequately protected during
the storms. As a result of the integration of disaster
risk reduction in wider government planning
processes, such knowledge also feeds into social
planning, for example care for the elderly.
In Ceará the current system is the result of many
different incarnations of disaster management to
which incremental changes have been implemented.
For instance, the agency has been able to learn from
past failure to improve response to drought.
However, organisational flexibility is higher in the
Cayman Islands than in Ceará. Whereas the NHC has
been able to review its composition (to ensure it
maintains the appropriate membership), its structure
and network arrangements, its funding allocation,
and its responsibilities after each disaster, CEDEC, as
a bureaucratic agency has been much less flexible.
For example, although managers would very much
like to adopt a more preventive disaster programme,
the agency is unable to move funds around in its
budget and many times have had to wait for a crisis
to be able to access earmarked funds. In contrast, the
NHC has discretion to design and implement new
initiatives to reduce risk. This feature is built in to
disaster risk reduction policy and allows decision-
makers to make adjustments and take politically
motivated actions. Whereas this can be harmful in
places where corruption may be prevalent (such as
Ceará) decision-makers in the Cayman Islands, as
with other Caribbean island states, assume that the
advantages of flexibility outweigh its disadvantages
(Pugh 2006). This is particularly true in terms of
being able to use political capital for setting
development priorities or pushing forward long-term
planning goals.
In this context, the role of committed civil servants has
been pivotal for policy success. In the Cayman Islands,
members of the NHC are highly motivated,
enthusiastic and trusted civil servants who were seen
to be investing time and energy beyond what was
required to improve hurricane planning in the islands.
The strong, influential and well-respected chair of
the NHC worked diligently to raise the profile of
hurricane risk within the government. The inclusion
of representatives of groups, such as the churches
and members of social services, with a remit to care
for the poor and the vulnerable, guaranteed that the
NHC addressed the needs of the broad cross-section
of the Cayman Islands society, thereby strengthening
the ground-roots support for the Committee.
In Ceará CEDEC’s reform-oriented managers were
equally committed to change their disaster
management. Many of these managers had been
trying for years to reform disaster management and
the emergence of a progressive state governor gave
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them the first real opportunity at galvanising political
capital to push for reform (Tendler 1997; Lemos
2003). However, CEDEC’s new approach was not
without fierce resistance and the managers faced
strong local opposition (Lemos 2003). By using a
‘technical’ approach to drought relief these
managers were able to insulate their decision-
making process from politics and protect public
resources. Their insistence that the COMDECs
included representatives from organisations
committed to the poor, such as the Church and
labour unions, may also have diluted politicians’
dominance at the local level despite the persistence
of clientelism, especially during drought emergency
(personal communication 2002).
Moreover, managers and organisations in both cases
sought to integrate disaster management with other
policies and to implement long-term disaster policy.
While in Ceará, the results of such integration have
been mixed (Lemos 2007), the Cayman Islands fared
much better (Tompkins 2005). In Ceará, several
attempts to create a formal integrated structure have
mostly failed in practice (Carvalho et al. 1993), with
many programmes not succeeding beyond their
planning phase (Lemos 2007). At the national level
however, there have been the creation of integrated
anti-poverty programmes, such as the Bolsa Familia
(a monthly cash voucher for poor families) that may
critically shape local level vulnerability to drought.
The Cayman Islands’ government has mainstreamed
disaster risk reduction by embedding risk management
into all areas of policymaking. Long-term risk
management is incorporated through integrated land
use planning. The Development and Planning
Committee within the Cayman Islands’ government
requires participation from all government
departments to ensure that plans rolled out achieve
the broader objectives of the Cayman Islands’
government. While all parties do not necessarily agree
with all elements within these plans, the process of
decision-making is essentially an integrated, cross-
departmental one that strives to tie in with the overall
national structure, that incorporates principles of
disaster risk reduction and that focuses on long-term
social and economic development.
In both places, the reliance on these four markers of
good governance has decidedly increased the
positive returns from disaster management. Despite
the fact that much higher levels of poverty and
inequality in NE Brazil have resulted in much slower
progress in decreasing general vulnerabilities, the
steadfast move from a clientelist and insulated
disaster management response to a more
democratic, participatory and inclusionary one has
resulted in palpable gains for the poor in times of
climate-related crisis (Lemos 2003; Lemos 2007;
Nelson and Finan 2007). Although there is a long
way to go, the experience in the Cayman Islands, and
in NE Brazil, suggest that a concerted pursuit of
disaster risk reduction policies that seek at the same
time to address deeper inequalities, can critically
affect overall vulnerabilities, particularly among the
poorest segments of the population.
3 Two tiers, one goal
While progress in disaster risk reduction has been
well documented and broadly positive, the history of
addressing the structural inequalities at the root of
socioenvironmental vulnerabilities has been much
less positive. Not surprisingly deeper structural
transformation is not easy to implement either
economically or politically, as decades of failed
development and anti-poverty interventions
demonstrate. In both cases studied in this article, we
find that the presence of the four factors for
effective risk reduction (flexible, learning-based,
responsive governance; committed, reform-minded
and politically active actors; disaster risk reduction
integrated into other social and economic policy
processes; and a long-term commitment to
managing risk) have improved response to disaster
even if the outcome in the NE Brazil case has fallen
short of the magnitude needed. By choosing to
focus on these four factors, we intentionally pursue a
higher level of generalisation that hopefully can be
relevant to other regions and case studies beyond
the two we target here, especially systems that are
increasingly vulnerable to global climate change. We
believe that looking at how systems and groups
respond to climate variability-driven stress can inform
future policy focusing on prevention and response to
a changing climate.
This approach to drought response has come a long
way from the clientelism-infested actions of the past
and reflects a synergistic dynamic between
socioeconomic and political reform and risk reduction.
While there is still much to do in Ceará to reduce
drought vulnerability, significant progress has been
achieved in relation to ‘traditional’ disaster
management. We also found that by incorporating
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well-tested good governance practices in disaster risk
reduction, especially the involvement of stakeholders
committed to improving the lot of the poorest and
most marginalised along with more open and
democratic decision mechanisms, both regions may
have paved the way for deeper reform. In the Cayman
Islands, the recognition of the need to include those
least able to cope with storms contributed to a
longer-term repositioning and reprioritisation of the
poor in government planning. In the case of NE
Brazil, the empowerment of local collective action
structures may have both diluted elite dominance and
constrained the most negative aspects of corrupt
drought response. While these actions are not
sufficient to spearhead structural reform, they may
wear away the inequalities (social, economic and
political) that shape vulnerability in less developed
regions. To go even further, bridging institutions, such
as the NHC in the Cayman Islands, linking disaster risk
managers with the development planners are
required to ensure that the palliative care offered by
disaster risk reduction is not used as an alternative to
deeper structural surgical reforms that may be
needed to address the issues of inequality in society.
Notes
1 The IPCC defines adaptive capacity as ‘the ability
of a system to adjust to climate change (including
climate variability and extremes), to moderate
potential damages, to take advantage of
opportunities, or to cope with the consequences’
(IPCC 2001: 928).
2 Research for the Ceará case has been funded by
grants from the National Science Foundation
(Award #SES 0233961) and the National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(Award #NA03OAR4310010). Field research has
been made in separate field campaigns carried
out during 2000–05 and included over 70
in-depth interviews with policymakers (disaster
managers, water managers and extension agents)
as well as the governor of the state and local level
key informants. Research for the Cayman Islands
case study was funded through a Tyndall Centre
for Climate Change Research Fellowship. The
research took place during 2002–05 and included
over 70 interviews with the heads of government
departments, leaders of industry, NGOs,
community-based and faith-based organisations,
and individuals.
3 For a detailed account of these changes, see
Tompkins and Hurlston (2003) for the Cayman
Islands case; and Lemos (2003, 2007) for the
Ceará case.
4 For a detailed account of this transformation, see
Tendler (1997).
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